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Few provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code' have sparked
so much controversy as Article Nine's "floating lien" on after-acquired
property.2 The most intensive criticism has come from the bankruptcy
bar, which views the after-acquired property lien as a major threat
to the rights of general creditors in bankruptcy.3 The "floating lien"
arises from Section 9-204(3) of the Code, which permits a lender and
his debtor to agree to secure a debt by property all or part of which
is acquired after the debt is incurred.4 The use of the Code "floating
lien," however, has been limited by a widespread feeling that it con-
flicts with the Bankruptcy Act's prohibition against preferential trans-
fers. Any security device by which a debtor can tie up all of his assets,
present and future, is seen as a danger to the interests of general
creditors.5 In practice, however, a debtor has long been able to en-
cumber future property by the use of one or more recognized security
devices. 6 Inventory financing, for example, may be accomplished by
supplemental chattel mortgages on additions to inventory as part of
a scheme of revolving credit whereby the debtor continually repays
the old debt and the creditor continually extends new credit, receiving
a new lien in return. 7 This technique encounters no difficulties under
the Bankruptcy Act. The bankruptcy bar, however, has argued that
1. Hereinafter cited as U.C.C.
2. Compare Gordon, The Security Interest in Inventory under Article- 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code and the Preference Problem, 62 CoLum. L. REv. 49 (1962) and Sutkowski,
Inventory Financing under the U.C.C., the Secured Creditor's Dream?, 63 Conm. L.J. 95
(1963), with Friedman, The Bankruptcy Preference Challenge to After-Acquired Property
Clauses under the Code, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 194 (1959), Henson, "Proceeds" under the
Uniform Commercial Code, 65 CoLum. L. REv. 232 (1965), and Henson, § 9-108 of the
Uniform Commercial Code and § 6 0a of the Bankruptcy Act Reconciled, 21 Bus. IvIAw R
371 (1966).
3. See Gordon and Sutkowski, supra note 2.
4. U.C.C. § 9-204(3): "... [A] security agreement may provide that collateral. whenever
acquired, shall secure all obligations covered by the security agreement.' See Comments 2
and 3 to this Section.
5. See, e.g., In re Portland Newspaper Pub. Co., 3 U.C.C. REP. 194, 214 (D. Ore. 1966);
Hogan, Future Goods, Floating Liens and Foolish Creditors, 17 STAN. L. RE%,. 822 (1963).
6. E-g., trust receipt, conditional sale, factors lien, field warehousing.
7. A common arrangement is for the debtor to hold receipts from sales of inventory in
an express trust for the benefit of the lender, who will make further ad-ances from such
funds against the acquisition of new inventory if it is made subject to his security interest
by the execution and filing of supplemental chattel mortgages. The practical disadvantages
of such a scheme are obvious in the cases where inventory is subject to rapid turnover.
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using Section 9-204(3) to achieve precisely the same result involves a
transfer for an antecedent debt which, if made within four months




The ultimate test of any security device is its ability to resist attack
by a trustee in bankruptcy.0 The less certain its validity, the less de-
sirable it will appear to a lender.10 Lenders can be expected to avoid
the Code's "floating lien" on after-acquired property so long as there
exists any substantial probability that a bankruptcy court will find it a
preferential transfer voidable under Section 60.11
Section 60 is a statutory reversal of the common law rule which
permitted an insolvent debtor to make transfers to select creditors,
even though these transfers deprived remaining creditors of any share
in the debtor's estate.12 Under Section 60, an insolvent debtor's crea-
tion of a lien on his property within four months of bankruptcy for
other than contemporaneous consideration will constitute a prefer-
ential transfer if the transferee knew or had reason to know the debtor
was insolvent. Such transfers are voidable by the trustee, who may thus
pad the cushion of assets available for the pro rata satisfaction of un-
secured general creditors. 3 Section 60 thereby seeks to ensure that
all creditors of the same class will share equally in the debtor's mis-
8. 11 U.S.C. § 96(a).
9. 1 P. COOGAN, HOGAN & VAGTS, SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UN1FORI COMMER-
CIAL CODE § 9.01 (1967) [hereinafter cited as COOGAN, HOGAN & VAGTS].
10. Although creditors frequently will rely upon devices subject to upset, they will only
do so if they can exact a toll commensurate with the risk involved. If the uncertainty Is
too great, the premium demanded may be so high as to preclude the use of otherwile at-
tractive financing devices.
11. See 1 COOGAN, HOGAN & VAGTS §§ 2.07, 7.12[8], where counsel for lenders are advised
to avoid the risk of eventual challenge in bankruptcy by framing security interests in future
property along traditional lines (e.g., in the case of inventory by incorporation of familiar
trust receipt limitations).
12. See 3 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 60.021] (14th ed. 1966) [hereinafter cited as COLLIER].
13. Section 60(a) defines a preference as a transfer of the debtor's property to a creditor
"[1] for or on account of an antecedent debt, [2] made or suffered by such debtor while
insolvent [3] and within four months before the filing by or against him of the petition
initiating a proceeding under this Act, [4] the effect of which transfer will be to enable
such creditor to obtain a greater percentage of his debt than some other creditor of the
same class." Bankruptcy Act § 60a, 11 U.S.C. § 96(a)(1) (1964). If a transfer meets these four
criteria and, in addition, [5] "the creditor receiving it or to be benefited thereby or his
agent acting with reference thereto has, at the time when the transfer is made, reasonable
cause to believe that the debtor is insolvent," then such transfer may be avoided as prefer-
ential by the trustee. Bankruptcy Act § 60b, 11 U.S.C. § 96(b) (1964). There is no question
that the creation of a security interest is included within the meaning of "tran.fer" as
defined by Section 1(30) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 1(30) (1964).
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fortune.14 For the remainder of this note, it will be assumed that we
are talking of transfers made by an insolvent debtor to a knowing
transferee. 15
The time at which the transfer is completed is crucial. The trustee
can reach a Code after-acquired property interest only if the transfer
can be said to occur within the four-month period before bankruptcy
and if there is no new value given by the creditor.10 Because Section
60a(2) of the Bankruptcy Act provides that a transfer of personal
property will be deemed made when perfected under state law against
subsequent judicial lien creditors,17 the determination of when a trans-
fer has taken place is, at least in this sense, a question of state law.18
Whenever a transfer involves the creation of a security interest in per-
sonal property, the time when the transfer transpires is determined by
Article Nine in the great majority of states. 10
Article Nine provides that a security interest is perfected (1) when
all of the applicable steps required for perfection have been taken and
(2) when it has attached.2 0 The first requirement presents no difficul-
ties. The most common after-acquired property agreements involve
the financing of inventories or accounts receivable.2 1 In either case,
the "steps required for perfection" are completed upon the filing of
a financing statement describing the collateral and providing for the
extension of the lien to after-acquired property.2 2 Unfortunately, the
question of when a security interest "attaches" invites excursions
into metaphysics. Section 9-204(1) provides that a security interest
"attaches" when there is agreement that it shall attach and value is
given and the debtor has rights in the collateral. The debtor's rights
14. See 3 CoLLrEn 60.01.
15. The further requirement that the transfer was "to enable such creditor to obtain
a greater percentage of his debt than some other creditor of the same class" will be deemed
present whenever all of the other enumerated elements of a voidable preference exist.
See generally 3 Cot Tmg 60.34, 60.35.
16. Tranfers perfected before the four-month period and transfers occurring within the
four-month period but given for new value are beyond the trustee's reach. See 3 CouaMi
T 60.19, 60.32.
17. 11 U.S.C. § 96(a)(2) (1964).
18. 3 CoLum 60.39[2].
19. As of July 1, 1967, the U.C.C. had been enacted and become law in 45 states. Ari-
zona, Idaho, Mississippi and South Carolina have effective dates in 1968, leaving only
Louisiana, which has no present plans for adoption of the Code. 3 U.C.C. Rep. Release 12
(Feb. 1, 1967).
20. U.C.C. § 9-303.
21. The balance of this Note is confined to the specific problems of future inventory and
accounts receivable financing under the Code. Much of what is said may apply as well to
'other kinds of collateral, but no attempt is made to deal comprehensively with the whole
spectrum of after-acquired property problems which may arise under Article Nine.
22. See U.C.C. § 9-402.
141
The Yale Law Journal
in future inventory or accounts receivable normally are not in exis-
tence at the time of the financing agreement; the security interest in
after-acquired property thus cannot attach (and hence cannot be
perfected) until the debtor acquires rights in that property. There-
fore, when the debtor acquires rights in any collateral subject to an
after-acquired property agreement within four months of bankruptcy,
the uncritical answer is that he has perfected-i.e., has made-a trans-
fer during that critical period, thereby creating a preference voidable
under Section 60.
This apparent delay in the perfection of an after-acquired property
security interest creates a conflict between the secured lender and the
bankruptcy trustee. Take the hypothetical case in which, on January 1,
L (Lender) advances $50,000 to D (Debtor) upon D's agreement to
give L a security interest in both his present stock and future acquisi-
tions of inventory. A financing statement describing the collateral
subject to L's security interest is filed for record on the same day. Ten
months later D goes into bankruptcy with $30,000 of inventory, all of
which was acquired by D in the four months prior to bankruptcy. L
will claim the entire $30,000 on the authority of the after-acquired
property provision of his January 1 lien. The trustee in bankruptcy,
however, will argue that since D's debt was incurred on January 1, all
of the additions to inventory during the four months prior to bank-
ruptcy must be deemed transfers to L for an antecedent debt, creating
preferences voidable by him under Section 60.
The Code draftsmen perceived this threat to the Code's after-
acquired property lien. They attempted to escape the trustee's reach
by providing in Section 9-108 of the Code that ordinary-course trans-
fers of after-acquired collateral should be deemed made for new
value . 3 Since transfers within the critical four-month period for new
value are not voidable preferences, the after-acquired property secu-
rity interest would be beyond the trustee's reach. But the propriety of
this escape hatch is questionable.2 4 The definition of antecedent debt
23. Where a secured party makes an advance, incurs an obligation, releases a perfected
security interest, or otherwise gives new value which is to be secured in whole or in
part by after-acquired property his security interest in the after-acquired collateral
shall be deemed to be taken for new value and not as security for an antecedent debt
if the debtor acquires his rights in such collateral either in the ordinary course of hig
business or under a contract of purchase made pursuant to the security agreement
within a reasonable time after new value is given.
U.C.C. § 9-108. Comment 1 to this Section makes it clear that the framers had Section 60
in mind when they drafted Section 9-108: "This rule is of importance principally in insol.
vency proceedings under the federal Bankruptcy Act or state statutes which make certain
transfers for antecedent debt voidable as preferences."
24. As a leading commentator notes, Section 9-108 has "sometimes been considered as
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in the Bankruptcy Act appears to be purely a matter of federal law,
not to be superseded by state "fictional" definitions. - Nothing in
Section 9-108, the "§ 60 bulls"26 argue, can alter the fact that the
original giving of value came long before our debtor acquired any
interest in the stock of inventory he held at bankruptcy.
Even if Section 9-108 is ultimately rejected by bankruptcy courts
unwilling to let state law defeat the policy of the federal bankruptcy
law by Pickwickian definitions, there are at least two alternative argu-
ments for validating at least some "floating liens" in bankruptcy: the
early perfection theory, and the substitution of collateral analysis. The
first and simpler of the two, although accepted by at least two lower
courts, is unacceptable because it relies on verbal conceptualism to im-
munize all after-acquired property interests from the Bankruptcy Act's
prohibition against preferential transfers. The second, by contrast, ex-
amines various fact situations involving the "floating lien." Instead
of anointing all "floating liens" with the oil of Article Nine, it rejects
those antithetical to the policy of the Bankruptcy Act, thereby medi-
ating between the uncritical approach of the Code and the exag-
gerated fears of the bankruptcy bar.
B. Early Perfection and Early Transfer
Under the Code, once the lender has given value and has filed a
financing statement, his security interest will be perfected automat-
ically when the debtor acquires rights in the collateral.= This means
that there is no time between the filing of the financing statement and
the debtor's acquisition of rights in the collateral during which a gen-
eral creditor could have asserted rights in the property superior to
those of the Code lender.28 Code supporters have fastened upon auto-
matic perfection to argue that for purposes of Section 60, a Code after-
acquired property interest should be considered fully perfected at
the time of the filing of the original financing statement since it is
from then on invulnerable to any subsequent judicial lien creditor.2
an almost laughably naive attempt to perpetrate a fraud on the Bankruptcy Act." 2
G. Gxnmoa, S~cumrY INTERESTS m PERsoNAL PRoPErry § 45.6, at 1309 (1965) [hcreinafter
cited as Gn2.ioR].
25. See Gordon, supra note 2, at 57-58; Riemer, Bankruptcy.Preference-Conflict between
Section 9-108 of U.C.C. & Sec. 60(a) of Bankruptcy Act, 70 Com. L.J. 63, 66-67 (1965); 3
CoLUER 60.51A [7.2].
26. Gilmore's appellation. 2 GLM.ORE § 45.6, at 1309.
27. U.C.C. §§ 9-204(1), 9-303; U.C.C. § 9-204, Comments 1-2.
28. See 2 GiLAtoRE § 35.6, at 936. See generally King, Section 9-10S of the U.C.C. Does It
insulate the Security Interest from Attack by a Trustee in Bankruptcy?, 114 U. PA. L. Rs'.
1117, 1132-33 (1966).
29. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 2, at 215-19.
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They reason that since the bankruptcy trustee's status under Section
60 is that of a hypothetical judicial lien creditor,"0 any security interest
sufficiently perfected to preclude subsequent general creditors from
asserting a claim superior to that of the Code lender should likewise
be insulated from attack by the trustee in bankruptcy. This is equiv-
alent to saying that the transfer, for bankruptcy purposes, is perfected
at the time of the original financing agreement. Like Section 9-108,
this argument would made the Code after-acquired property interest
always immune in bankruptcy. While the result is the same, however,
the tactical approaches differ. Section 9-108 would admit that a trans-
fer has been "made" within the four-month period, but would attempt
to make it by definition for "new value." The early perfection argu-
ment, on the other hand, attempts to show that no transfer has been
"made" during the four-month period, thereby neatly avoiding the
difficulty of arguing that "new value" has passed when the only exten-
sion of credit occurred months previously.
Unhappily, this "early perfection" argument, to be successful, must
overcome Section 9-204's requirement that "a security interest cannot
attach until . . . the debtor has rights in the collateral." The early
perfectionist must argue, in the face of this section, that an interest
may be perfected before any new property to which the interest could
attach has been transferred to the debtor.3 1
The apparent barrier of Section 9-204 is attacked through the meta-
physics of "attaches"-it is hypothesized that the original transaction
between lender and debtor amounts to an actual present transfer of
the entire inventory (or accounts receivable) of the debtor, existing
and future, as a single "entity. ' 32 One of the most elaborate versions
of the entity theory describes the original transaction as a transfer of
"an existing property right of 'potential' existence. It is a present
contingent property res. The existence of the debtor's business fur-
nishes the present property out of which the future contingency can
arise."33
30. See 3 COLLIER 60.38[2], at 949.
31. It is difficult to see how a security interest could arise in property before the debtor
has any right in it. See U.C.c. § 9-303, Comment 1: "The term 'attach' is used in this Article
to describe the point at which property becomes subject to a security interest [emphasis
added]." Read in tandem with U.C.C. § 9-204, § 9-303 must thus be taken to mean that
no property is subject to a security interest until the debtor acquires rights in It. See also
U.C.C. § 2-105(2) relating to the sale of goods: "Goods must be both existing and identified
before any interest in them can pass."
32. Friedman, supra note 2, at 219.
33. Id. at 224. This language is from Friedman's proposed Official Comment to tie
revision of § 9-108 he recommends. But see Sutkowski, supra note 2, at 102-103.
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But the early perfection cum entity theory is primarily an attempt
to exorcise the objections of the bankruptcy bar by attaching new
names to familiar objects. Article Nine might have provided unequiv-
ocally that the transfer of property under an after-acquired property
security interest occurs at the time at which there is agreement, value
is given, and the financing statement is filed. Section 60a(2), after all,
does leave to state law the determination of when a transfer is per-
fected 34 Unfortunately, Article Nine makes no provision for the
attachment of an after-acquired property security interest before the
time at which "the debtor has rights in the collateral." The entity
theorist must make the linguistically embarrassing argument that the
phrase "the debtor has rights in the collateral" creates a present trans-
fer of property in which the debtor has no present interest simply by
virtue of the fact that both present and future property may be de-
scribed by one collective noun- "inventory.' 3
Moreover, the early perfectionists are contradicted by the very exis-
tence of Section 9-108. If the Code's draftsmen had considered the
lender's interest "perfected" at the time of filing and thus insulated
from attack by the trustee under Section 60, why did they add the
present value provisions of Section 9-108?3 At least one early perfec-
tionist has called Section 9-108 self-defeating and a major tactical
blunder which only "directs judicial attention to a problem which
... does not exist."37 A blunder it may be, but the fact that Section
9-108 is there suggests that the draftsmen had no confidence that the
early perfection theory could be relied upon in bankruptcy.
The early perfectionist-entity argument avoids rather than meets
the claim that the Code "floating lien" legitimates transactions con-
trary to the policy of the Bankruptcy Act. Some of the possible arrange-
ments for security in after-acquired collateral validated by the early
perfection theory are shown below to exemplify exactly the kinds of
estate-depleting transfers Congress sought to prohibit in Section 60. s
Ingenious or ingenuous verbal formulae rationalizing the present
34. Notes 17-18 and p. 141 supra.
35. The entity theory, in other words, depends upon a showing that Article Nine in-
tended to make the after-acquired property security interest secure againt a hypotlictical
judicial lien creditor from the moment the security interest came into existence. The
Article Nine provision governing the attachment of a security interest- 9.204()-prevents
us from making such an assertion about the hypothetical judicial lien creditor. Therefore
the trustee in bankruptcy may argue that the transfer of after-acquired property cannot
be said to have been perfected until some time after the security interest was first created.
36. Note 23 supra.
37. Friedman, supra note 2, at 220.
38. See text of Section E following note 65 infra.
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property status of rights in future property ought not to overcome a
trustee who demonstrates that the disputed transfers are in direct
conflict with the Congressional intent to prevent preferential de-
pletion of a bankrupt's estate within four months of bankruptcy,"'
C. The Substitution of Collateral Theory
It has long been held that a mere substitution or exchange of
property is not preferential except to the extent that the value of the
creditor's interest in the substituted property exceeds the value of the
creditor's interest in the original property.40 A typical case of non-
preferential substitution occurs when a debtor and a creditor agree
that Blackacre, rather than Whiteacre, shall be security for an out-
standing mortgage, and Blackacre is worth no more than or less than
Whiteacre. Such a transfer, although relating to an antecedent debt,
is not considered a transfer for an antecedent debt because it results
in no depletion of the debtor's estate.41
Some Code proponents have suggested that the Article Nine "float-
ing lien" can be defended in bankruptcy on a substituted collateral
rationale.42 Insofar as inventory or accounts receivable at the time
of bankruptcy represent substitutes for earlier collateral in which the
lender had a fully perfected interest, no preference, it is argued, results
by giving effect to the lien.43
This theory has been challenged on the grounds that prior case
law requires that the exchange of security be simultaneous or that the
lender police his security interest by acquiring rights in new collateral
before releasing his interest in old collateral.44 Simultaneity will often
be lacking under the Code where the debtor is given complete free-
dom over the collateral and may dispose of it free of the lender's in-
terest long before new inventory or accounts are acquired to take its
place. The cases establishing the simultaneous substitution rule, how-
ever, came well before the Code and therefore are unreliable prece-
39. See Gordon, supra note 2, at 70-71; Note, Bankruptcy-Preferences-After-Acquired
Property Provisions of the U.C.C. Held Inapplicable in Bankruptcy Proceedings as Conflict-
ing with Section 60a of the Bankruptcy Act, 42 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 150, 157 (1967).
40. See 3 CoLLE 60.20 ("Diminution or Depletion of the Estate Is Essential'), and
cases cited.
41. See 3 CoLLiR 60.21, and cases cited.
42. 2 GILMORE § 45.6, at 1315; Legislation, Article IX of the Uniform Commercial Code.
The "Floating" Lien, 37 ST. JOHN'S U.L. Rxv. 392, 400 (1963).
43. Note that the substitution of collateral theory accepts that additions to inventory
or accounts are transfers by the debtor within the critical four month period; it morel)
denies that they are preferential transfers.
44. Gordon, supra note 2, at 62; Sutkowski, supra note 2, at 101.
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dents for cases arising under the Code's automatically-perfected lien
on after-acquired property.
Often cited for the simultaneous substitution rule is In re Lambert
& Braceland Co. 45 where the court held an accounts receivable financ-
ing arrangement voidable by the trustee where the debtor had the
"privilege" of substituting accounts of equal value for those originally
assigned as security.46 Although the precise grounds of the decision are
less than clear, the court was concerned with the debtor's almost un-
limited freedom over collateral, in violation of the rule in Benedict v.
Ratner,47 and especially troubled by the fact that the arrangement
amounted to a secret lien against the property.
But to the extent that the rationale for the simultaneous substitu-
tion rule is an extension of the dominion rule of Benedict v. Ratner,
no objection on such grounds can be raised against the Article Nine
security interest in after-acquired property. Benedict v. Ratner in-
volved only a disputed point of state law regarding fraudulent
transfers in circumstances where the debtor was given the power to
terminate the lender's interest at any time. Section 9-205 of the Code
now affirms as a matter of state law the validity of a security interest
where the debtor has unrestricted control over the collateral. 48 Nor
can a secret lien objection be raised to inventory or accounts receivable
financing under the Code, for an Article Nine security interest in after-
acquired property is perfected only on filing, when it becomes a matter
of public record. 49
But the Lambert & Braceland court also stressed that once accounts
subject to the lender's lien were collected, the lender had no control
45. 29 F.2d 758 (E.D. Pa. 1928).
46. In practice, the debtor would collect outstanding accounts as they came due during
the month, would deposit the proceeds in a general account and would then, at ie end of
the month, furnish the lender with a schedule of new accounts of appro.ximately equal
value. None of the obligors was ever notified of any of the assignments and no entries
were made upon the books of the company to segregate the accounts assigned.
47. 268 U.S. 353 (1925). The trustee was allowed to recover as a fraudulent transfer
amounts paid to a lender within four months of bankruptcy under a prior assignment of
present and future accounts receivable. Construing New York cases, the Supreme Court
decided that as a matter of New York law, where "unrestricted dominion over the proceeds
is reserved to the mortgagor... the mortgage is void." Id. at 264.
48. See U.C.C. § 9-205, Comment 1. Under § 9-205, a security interest
... is not invalid or fraudulent against creditors by reason of liberty in the debtor
to use, commingle or dispose of all or part of the collateral ... or to collect or com-
promise accounts, contract rights or chattel paper ... or to use, commingle or dis-
pose of proceeds, or by reason of the failure of the secured party to require the debtor
to account for proceeds or replace collateral....
And note that apart from the question of preference, the Bankruptcy Act leaves all ques-
tions regarding the construction, validity and operation of security arrangements and
other transfers of property to state law. See 3 CoyLTTER S 60.13, and cases cited.
49. See U.C.C. § 9-302.
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over what new accounts became subject to the lien; which accounts,
if any, to be brought within the lien were completely within the
debtor's disposition.5 0 Whatever the merits of this latter concern on
the facts of Lambert & Braceland, this is not a problem under the
Code. The Code gives no such freedom of choice to the debtor: all
inventory or all accounts receivable acquired within the terms of the
security agreement are brought automatically within the lender's lien
by operation of law at the moment of their acquisition. 1 Once the
debtor has granted a security interest in after-acquired property, he can
do nothing to avoid the attachment of the lien as he acquires future
property. The Code debtor, however great his dominion over collateral,
has no real power to avoid the lender's interest in after-acquired prop-
erty which could pass to a trustee in bankruptcy. 2 He can, of course,
let his inventory run down and go out of business. But he cannot remain
in business and avoid the attachment of the creditor's security interest.
Moreover, if the debtor does simply liquidate, there is no preference to
the inventory creditor. Rather, the inventory creditor who does not in-
sist upon any power to police the substitution of collateral and instead
accepts an after-acquired property security interest under the Code is
the only creditor who stands to lose. If the debtor liquidates his inven-
tory or accounts receivable, this will redound to the benefit of the
general creditors since funds which otherwise would have been locked
up in secured assets thereby become available for their satisfaction."
Imputation of a simultaneity requirement into the Section 60 law
of preferential transfers would be justified only if it served to block
evasions of the policy of the Bankruptcy Act. But if non-simultaneity
and non-policing will make the secured creditor no better off, and
possibly worse off, than he would be with policing and simultaneity,
no interests except those of complicating the process of inventory
financing can be served by a simultaneity requirement. 4 Policing in.
50. 29 F.2d at 759. The lender's interest in the accounts actually submitted did not
arise until receipt by him of each month's new list.
51. U.C.C. §§ 9-204 and 9-303 together provide for the automatic perfection of an other.
wise complete security interest in property on acquisition by the debtor. Cf. Friedman,
supra note 2, at 215, 219.
52. See In re Pusey, Maynes, Breish Co., 122 F.2d 606, 608 (3d Cir. 1941) (also often cited
for the simultaneity rule), where the court explained: "Perhaps a more practical approach
to the reason for the rule is simply that the debtor's power of control to end the lien is one
which passes to an attacking creditor or to a trustee in bankruptcy, as the case may be."
53. Assuming that the inventory creditor is unable to assert a good claim to proceeds
under the tracing provisions of U.C.C. § 9-306(4).
54. It should be noted, however, that there is nothing in the Code to prevent the lender
from requiring that the security agreement contain some or all of the usual policing provi-
sions designed to protect his interest in the collateral. Few cases, in fact, are envisioned
where a lender would allow his debtor the unrestricted freedom over collateral possible
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creases the costs to the secured creditor and the debtor without pro-
viding any additional safeguards for the general creditor, the intended
beneficiary of Section 60. Therefore, removal of the state law require-
ments of simultaneity and policing does not demand their reintroduc-
tion through interpretation of the Bankruptcy Act in order to protect
the interests of general creditors.
D. Two Theories in Search of a Sponsor: The Judicial Response
There are only two reported cases dealing with the U.C.C.'s "float-
ing lien" on after-acquired property-both decided earlier this year
in federal district courts. Both opinions drew heavily upon the verbal
distinctions necessary to support the early perfectionists' defense of
the Code.
In the first of these, Rosenberg v. Rudnickh, the creditor claiming
under the Code prevailed over the trustee in bankruptcy. District
Judge Ford relied on the early perfection and entity theory to hold
that the creditor's security interest in the debtor's inventory was per-
fected at the time the creditor gave value and took the security interest
in inventory. The trustee's contention that the security interest could
not have attached until the debtor acquired some interest in the items
making up his inventory was brushed aside: "In applying § 60 . . .
inventory subjected to a security interest should be viewed as a single
entity and not as a mere conglomeration of individual items each
subject to a separate lien."5ao
Judge Ford turned to Section 9-108 to reinforce his decision, hold-
ing that since almost all states had adopted the Code, the "new value"
definition of that section "should be regarded as generally accepted
and in accord with current business practice and understanding and
hence applied in bankruptcy."57 Alternatively, the intent of the Code
to make such a transfer non-preferential should be respected: "[t]he
Code's provisions as to perfection and attachment of security interests
should not be interpreted to produce a different result."68 Rosenberg
therefore depends either on the entity fiction or upon the bald propo-
under the Code. What is to be emphasized is that the Code leaves such arrangements to
the discretion of the parties who, it is hoped, will be able to tailor their arrangement to
fit their own special needs and not always with a wary eye on the Bankruptcy Act. See
Spivack, The Impact of Article 9 of the UCC on Creditors' Rights in Bankruptcy, 86 Tvnp.
L.Q. 183, 192-94 (1963); Henson, "Proceeds" under the U.C.C.. supra note 2, at 237-38.
55. 262 F. Supp. 635 (D. Mass. 1967).
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sition that if enough states insist that a transfer is for "new value,"
any transfer, whenever protected, may be insulated from the trustee.
The second decision came in late August, when the District Court
of Oregon reversed the referee's opinion in In re Portland Newspaper
Publishing Co. and upheld a Code "floating lien" on accounts re-
ceivable.59 The referee had ruled that Section 9-108 was insufficient
to overcome the conclusion that the attachment of the creditor's
security interest to accounts acquired by the debtor within four
months of bankruptcy constituted a transfer for an antecedent debt .60
Judge Solomon treated the appeal as involving two questions: Was
there a transfer during the four-month period? And, if so, was this a
transfer for an antecedent debt? 1 He answered the first question in
the negative by adopting Judge Ford's entity argument from Rosen-
berg: the transfer "was made when the security agreement was exe-
cuted and not when each item of inventory was acquired by the
debtor. ' 62 Had he followed Rosenberg strictly, he need have gone no
further; for a transfer made prior to the four-month period is beyond
the trustee's reach under Section 60.
Judge Solomon, however, went on to consider whether or not the
transfer, if deemed made during the four months prior to bankruptcy,
could be considered a transfer for an antecedent debt. He admitted
that Section 9-108 would deny that a transfer for an antecedent debt
had been made, but felt it necessary-even in the face of widespread
state acceptance of the Code-to decide whether or not the facts
before him presented a conflict between Section 9-108 and the policy
of the Bankruptcy Act. "Without a clear-cut conflict," he stated, Sec-
tion 9-108 "should not be held to contravene Section 60."03 Because
during the four months prior to bankruptcy accounts of $397,860 were
replaced by new accounts of $395,085, Judge Solomon found that the
"floating lien" on the newspaper's accounts receivable had not vio-
lated Section 60's opposition to any creditor improving his position
over other creditors of the same class shortly before bankruptcy.01 Ad-
herence to Section 9-108 did not result in a diminution of the bank-
rupt's estate "because the creditor is only receiving a substitution of
59. No. B64-3282 (D. Ore., Aug. 22, 1967), 2 BANKR. L. REP. (4th ed.) 62,357, reversing
the referee's decision reported at 3 U.C.C. REP. 194, 2 BANKR. L. RrP. (4th ed.) 61,722
(D. Ore. 1966).
60. 3 U.C.C. REP. 194, 217-23; 2 BANKR. L. REP. (4th ed.) 61,722, at 71,141.
61. 2 BANKR. L. REP'. (4th ed.) 62,357, at 72,020.
62. Id. at 72,021.
63. Id. at 72,022.
64. Id.
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security. There is no preference when new accounts are substituted for
released old ones." 65
E. Substitution of Collateral in Practice
The metaphysical word-shuffling involved in the debates over the
early perfection and attachment of security interests makes the substi-
tution of collateral rationale a much more satisfactory -argument with
which to challenge the trustee in bankruptcy. If it is accepted that
nothing in the pre-Code simultaneity cases precludes the application
of the substitution of collateral doctrine to the Code "floating lien"
on after-acquired property, a way is open to harmonize the conflicting
claims of the Code lender and the bankruptcy trustee in a manner
which does full justice to the policy of Section 60 without emasculating
Article Nine.
But even the substitution of collateral rationale, as set forth by
Judge Solomon in the Portland Newspaper decision, may be inter-
preted in a manner which may frustrate the policy of the Bankruptcy
Act. Some of the possible transactions permitted by Section 9-108
might be characterized as substitution of collateral cases, but are
nevertheless in direct conflict with Section 60's policy of preventing
preferential diminution of the debtor's estate during the four months
prior to bankruptcy. Proponents of both sides in the debate over the
Article Nine security interest in after-acquired property have tended
to over-generalize, paying too little attention to actual cases likely
to arise under Article Nine. Even under a substitution of collateral
theory, only some of the possible sequences of events under standard
inventory or accounts receivable financing arrangements are con-
sistent with the Bankruptcy Act. Consider the following possible situa-
tions over the life of an inventory financing agreement, temporarily
ignoring any fluctuation during the intervals between the discrete
points in time identified in the table on page 152.
Cases 16 2: Inventory at Bankruptcy Equals or Is Less Than Original
Stock-in-Trade. Cases 1 and 2 represent typical situations in which
loans are secured by a presently existing stock of inventory the dollar
value of which remains constant or declines up to the time of bank-
ruptcy. These transactions appear to involve no preference under
Section 60. The actual items of inventory subject to the security
interest at the time of bankruptcy may all have been acquired by the
65. Id.
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HYPOTHETICAL AFTER-AcQuIRED INVENTORY FINANCING ARRANGM ENTS UNDER ARTICLE NINt
inventory level 7 2
10 months before inventory level inventory level
bankruptcy, when 4 months plus 1 at time of
financing agree- day before bank- filing for
ment signed ruptcy bankruptcy
Case 1 $50,000 $50,000 $50,000
Case 2 50,000 50,000 25,000
Case 3 0 50,000 50,000
Case 4 0 0 50,000
Case 5 25,000 25,000 50,000
Case 6 50,000 30,000 40,000
N.B. Value of loan by creditor in all cases = $50,000.
debtor during the four months prior to bankruptcy. However, an ex-
change or substitution of security of equal value involves no depletion
of the debtor's estate and therefore is of no prejudice to general credi-
tors. Here, the secured creditor is no better off at Ta (and in Case 2,
less well off) than he was at T 2 when he had an entirely perfected
interest in then-existing inventory equal to or greater in value than
the interest he seeks to assert at the time of bankruptcy.
Cases 1 and 2, where the overall value of inventory remains con-
stant or declines over time, therefore fit precisely within the terms of
the substitution rationale. If, as argued in the preceding section, there
is nothing to preclude the application of the substitution doctrine to
an Article Nine security interest, a court should enforce the lender's
interest in these cases against the trustee in bankruptcy.
Case 3: Inventory Acquired After Signing of Financing Agreement-
But More Than Four Months Prior to Bankruptcy. Cases 1 and 2
involved the classic inventory financing arrangement, where the lender
advances money on the strength of a stock of presently-existing in-
ventory. The Code, however, would also permit a lender to advance
money to be secured by property to be acquired entirely in the
future.60 Case 3 presents the problem of a loan unsecured by any
collateral when made, but secured at T2 , four months and one day
prior to bankruptcy, by a perfected interest in inventory of $50,000.
Obviously it cannot be argued that inventory at T 2 is a replacement
or substitute for inventory at the time of the agreement, Ti. But this
argument is unnecessary: the lender's interest at T 2 is fully perfected
at that time and beyond the reach of a trustee under Section 60. The
66. See note 4 supra; U.C.C. § 9-204, Comment 4.
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substitution argument need only be made for inventory replaced
within the critical four months period preceding bankruptcy. In Case
3, the values of the inventory at T2 and T, are identical. The substi-
tution rationale which validated the lender's interest in Gases 1 and 2
should be equally applicable to Case 3.
Case 4: Inventory Acquired After Signing of Financing Agreement
and Within Four Months of Bankruptcy. A very different problem is
presented by Case 4. Here, the entire security claimed by the lender
was acquired by the debtor within the four months preceding bank-
ruptcy. On these facts, the substitution theory must be unavailing.
Because no collateral existed at T2 , the lender never had a perfected
security interest in any inventory for which the inventory acquired
within four months of bankruptcy may be considered a substitute.
Even here, Section 9-108 would validate the lender's interest against
the trustee in bankruptcy. It states explicitly that any advance secured
in whole or in part by after-acquired property shall be deemed to be
taken for new value and not as security for an antecedent debt. Case
4 exemplifies the worst fears of the bankruptcy bar, and is within
Section 60's condemnation of depletions of the debtor's estate on the
eve of bankruptcy. Section 9-108 overreaches itself in seeking to af-
firm the security interest of our Case 4 lender against the trustee in
bankruptcy.
Case 5: Where Inventory Value Rises During the Four Months Pre-
ceding Bankruptcy. Case 5, in which existing inventory increases by
$25,000 between T2 and T 3, is really a variant of Case 4. Any interest
asserted in this increment by the secured creditor cannot be considered
to stem from the replacement of collateral under a perfected interest
in inventory antedating the critical four-month period. The substi-
tution of collateral rationale must be inapplicable to the $25,000 in-
crement, and the lender's interest in inventory must be rejected to
the extent that the value of inventory at bankruptcy exceeds its value
at T 2 .
Case 6: Where Inventory Value Falls Before, and Rises During, the
Four Months Preceding Bankruptcy. In Case 6 the value of the in-
ventory collateral falls from Ti to T 2, and then rises again during the
four months betveen T 2 and T 3. If the value of inventory at T gov-
erns the extent of the lender's interest in the inventory at bankruptcy,
then all $40,000 of inventory at T 3 will be subject to the lender's lien;
if the value at T 2 governs, only $30,000 will be within the lien.
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The lender will argue that the inventory value at T 1 should con-
trol. He will claim that it is in the nature of inventory to fluctuate,
although the average flow over the long run is constant. It is thus
unfair to limit the value of his lien to inventory at T2: the entire
period may be viewed as one of continuous substitution of collateral,
beginning with an original value of $50,000, and ending with a final
value of $40,000.
The trouble with the lender's argument, however, is that the sub-
sitution theory is irrelevant to transactions occurring outside the
period four months before bankruptcy. Case 3 demonstrated that an
advance against zero collateral will be secured in bankruptcy to the
extent of the value of a perfected security interest in inventory at T..
This is so not because the interest at T 2 represents new inventory
substituted for prior collateral, but simply because the inventory in-
terest at T 2 is the result of transfers to the lender perfected before
the four-month period and thus not subject to the trustee's power of
avoidance under Section 60. Section 60 makes no attempt to catch
transfers outside the four-month period; it focuses entirely upon that
period, the only period in which the substitution theory is relevant.
In Case 6 the value of inventory rose by $10,000 between T2 and
T3 . That increment is not a substitute for an interest perfected at the
onset of the four-month period and, under the reasoning of Case 5,
results in a $10,000 depletion of the debtor's estate within four months
of bankruptcy. The lender's interest at bankruptcy must be limited to
$30,000, the value perfected at T2
Although it may appear arbitrary to limit the value of the lender's
lien to the value of inventory existing on a single day (T 2), it is no
more arbitrary than the voidability of any transfer, otherwise impec-
cable, which occurs one day into the four-month period. The Bank-
ruptcy Act is an exercise in statutory line-drawing; all such endeavors
are likely to involve seemingly arbitrary results at the margin.
Our analysis has hitherto ignored the fluctuations in the value of
inventory occurring between T 2 and T 3. We have implicitly assumed
that the trend line of inventory value between T 2 and Ta is constant
or steadily increasing or decreasing. But this analysis does not exhaust
all possible cases. Some may still argue that fluctuations in the level of
collateral during the four-month period must result in a preference
voidable under Section 60. If the creditor at the time of bankruptcy
has a larger secured interest than he had three months earlier, the
argument runs, he must have received a preference during the four-
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month period if the other criteria for a preferential transfer are met.G
To pose an extreme example, suppose the debtor at T!! has $50,000
of inventory, which declines steadily until two days before T 3 to
S5,000. The next day, he acquires $45,000 of inventory, and the follow-
ing day he goes into bankruptcy. Looking solely at T2 and T3, this
appears no different from Case 1 and we might conclude that tie
creditor is secured at bankruptcy to $50,000 worth of inventory col-
lateral. But the pattern of events between T,2 and T 3 prima facie appears
to be an effort to prefer the inventory creditor in anticipation of bank-
ruptcy.
Blanket objections to the Code's "floating lien" based on such fluctu-
ations elevate form above substance. Such objections are but an
attempt to sneak the rejected requirement of simultaneous substitu-
tion back into the bankruptcy law. If the secured creditor were to
police so that receipts from inventory sales are not released to the
debtor's control until new collateral is provided, the value of his
security interest (the sum of unreleased receipts and inventory) pre-
sumably would remain constant. As argued above, 9 the most that
policing can accomplish for the creditor is to ensure that he has the
same security for his loan at T, that he had at T 2.
But we have also shown that the Code after-acquired property
agreement may at the most provide for the secured creditor at T3 a
secured interest equal to that which he had at T 2. The "floating lien"
therefore can never place the creditor in a better position than that
in which he would have been had the requirement of policing existed.
To reject the "floating lien" because of fluctuations of collateral be-
tween T2 and T 3 would have the same effect as introduction of an
explicit policing requirement, which is required by neither the Code
nor the Bankruptcy Act.69 The general creditors may easily protect
67. See note 13 supra.
68. See p. 148 supra.
69. In the so-called "net result" cases, the Supreme Court, followed by several liver
federal courts, has held that no Section 60 preference results from payments by a debtor
to a supplier of goods, even where such payments are not contemporaneous with delivery,
if they are part of a bona fide s)stem of open account on running credit, and there is no
net diminution of the debtor's estate within the four-month period taken as a %%hole. See
Jaquith v. Alden, 189 U.S. 78 (1903); In re Fred Stern & Co., 54 F.2d 478 (2d Cir. 1931);
In re Stewart, 233 F. Supp. 89 (D. Ore. 1964). The "net result' rule, taken alone, may be
a shaky basis for the Artide Nine "floating lien," for it has been limited by several courts
to situations in which the good faith of the creditor in the debtor's solvency is dear. See
Cooper Petroleum Co. v. Hart, No. 24,124 (5th Cir., June 29, 1967); Campanella v. Liebowitz,
103 F.2d 252 (3d Cir. 1939); 3 COT -ER 60.23. On the other hand, the argument that short.
term credit sales during the four-month period may operate to enrich rather than diminish
the debtor's estate applies equally well to the Code "floating lien." Inventory is inherently
subject to fluctuation, and so long as the creditor's security interest at Ta is equal to or less
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themselves by keeping one eye upon the past level of the debtor's
property subject to an after-acquired property security interest. Be-
cause the secured creditor can obtain at Ta no larger an interest than
that secured at T2, the general creditor will always know the maxi.
mum secured interest which the secured creditor can assert against the
general creditor in any bankruptcy occurring at any time within the
next four months.70
The statutory provision against fraud on the Bankruptcy Act will
limit the possibility of deliberate manipulations by the debtor. Section
67d(2)(d) of the Act7' makes fraudulent all transfers made within one
year of bankruptcy with "actual intent ... to hinder, delay or defraud
either existing or future creditors." It is true that "mere preferences"
without clear intent to delay or defraud other creditors are not swept
within this clause.72 But if the debtor led a general creditor to believe
that he would not re-expand his inventory to its value at T 2, and did
in fact expand it, Section 67d(2)(d) could apply.
It may be felt, however, that leaving the debtor free to increase the
amount of his assets subject to an Article Nine after-acquired prop-
erty interest at any time, for any reason, during the four months prior
to bankruptcy, is too great an invitation to play fast and loose. If some
further restriction is deemed necessary, a more discriminating tool
than Section 67 with its requirement of actual intent may be fashioned
out of relevant sections of the Bankruptcy Act and Article Nine.
Section 70e of the Act" confers upon the trustee in bankruptcy what-
ever powers, under either federal or state law, any creditor may have
had to avoid any fraudulent or otherwise voidable transfer. Section
9-108 of the Code provides that a creditor's security interest in after-
acquired property is deemed taken for new value "if the debtor ac-
quires his rights in such collateral ... in the ordinary course of his busi-
n2ess ....
than his interest secured at T2, there is no diminution of the debtor's estate during the
critical period.
70. We have argued that the interest secured by the creditor is measured by his origi-
nal loan to the debtor, or the amount secured at T. if less than the loan. The maximum
level of the collateral subject to the security interest at any time up to four months In the
past represents the maximum risk the general creditor runs of having the debtor's property
placed beyond his reach. If the highest level of inventory during the past four months
was $40,000 two months earlier, the maximum risk faced by the general creditor over the
next four months will be the assertion against him of a secured interest in inventory of
$40,000, even if the creditor had a security interest of, say, $50,000. If bankruptcy occurs
either earlier or later than two months in the future, a lesser amount of inventory will be
beyond the general creditor's reach.
71. 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(2)(d) (1964).
72. 4 CoLLmR 67.37, at 372-73 and cases cited nn.25-26.
73. 11 U.s.c. § 110(e) (1964).
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Although the ordinary-course-of-business rule has most often ap-
peared in the context of litigation over what kind of property acquired
by debtors is within the terms of after-acquired property agreements,
its appearance in Section 9-108-patently written with one eye upon
the Bankruptcy Act 74 -may give it a double edge. Not only does the
section delimit the creditor's security interest if there is default in the
absence of insolvency, but also it indicates the extent beyond which
the Code framers were unprepared to go in seeking to protect the Code
"floating lien" holder from the reach of the trustee in bankruptcy.
Comment One to the official text of Section 9-108 states that the
ordinary-course-of-business rule was intended to provide "otier credi-
tors the possibility, under the law of preferences, of subjecting to their
claims windfall or uncontemplated acquisitions shortly before bank-
ruptcy." This Comment is not free from ambiguity,- but it does indi-
cate that other creditors were to have a state law remedy against abuses
of the after-acquired property security interest. Because it is a state law
provision for the benefit of general creditors, this part of Section 9-108
should be available to the trustee in bankruptcy under Section 70e.70
It permits him to discriminate between transfers which do and do not
involve attempts to give special treatment to particular creditors just
prior to bankruptcy. Although Section 9-108 should not validate se-
curity interests which conflict with the policy of the Bankruptcy Act,
there is no reason why it should not operate to restrict, as a matter of
state law, the enforcement of particular security interests. Satisfaction
of Section 9-108 should be treated as a necessary but not sufficient con-
dition for an after-acquired property security interest to stand up to the
trustee in bankruptcy.77
Section 60 thus is not in irreconcilable conflict with Section 9-108.
Many transactions legitimated by Section 9-108 do not violate Section
60's prohibition of estate-depleting transfers within four months of
bankruptcy. On the other hand, Article Nine enthusiasts chary of any
74. See U.c.C. § 9-108, Comment 1: "This rule is of importance principally in insolvency
proceedings under the federal Bankruptcy Act or state statutes which make certain trans-
fers for antecedent debt voidable as preferences."
75. "Windfall" and "uncontemplated" are undefined, as is the time period described
by "shortly before bankruptcy."
76. Alternatively, power to set aside a transfer under the ordinary course of business
test of § 9-108 may come to the trustee through § 70c, 11 U.S.C. § 107(c) (19641), which
gives the trustee as of the date of bankruptcy the rights and powers of a h)pothetical
creditor who obtained a judgment against the bankrupt upon the date of bankruptcy.
77. Judge Solomon implied that this would be a possible use of the ordinary course of
business rule in Section 9-108. In re Portland Newspaper Publishing Co., 2 1.,,nmn. L. REP.
(4th ed.) 62,357, at 72,022 (D. Ore. 1967).
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effort to delimit the reach of the Code's "floating lien" must remember
that Section 60 does set limits to state law. The limitations upon the
"floating lien" set forth above should allay the worst fears of the bank-
ruptcy bar; moreover, they are capable of rational, predictable adminis-
tration by referees and courts in bankruptcy.
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